Juan Cole positively endorses Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s essay in Military Review, which criticizes early stages on the US operation in Iraq. The report makes interesting reading, and some of his criticism rings true, particularly the stress on how isolated the US military is from the Iraqis. US officers, unsurprisingly, have responded that this is not fair and they have a point. Blaming the soldiers, or even their generals, for insensitivity to local custom forgets the fact that they are not supposed to be diplomats. Doubtless they are often brutal, cruel and ignorant about local conditions but they are after all an army. They cannot be expected to win the battle for hearts and minds for the White House. That, as we have said before, would require some ideas.
This search for the moment at which the occupation went bad, the tipping point that turned it from Operation Iraqi Freedom into the seemingly intractable mess it is today, is pointless. Democratization by intervention, state-building or nation-building are a series of contradictions in terms. Nobody can impose such institutions from the outside, and the invasion of another country, the suppression of an existing government and anyone who chooses to support it, will always require an oppressive force.
Meanwhile Aylwin-Foster maintains a chauvinistic British outlook, dating back to the start of the war, which contrasts US inexperience in counterinsurgency operations, with the skills of the British. Where did the British learn these skills? Northern Ireland (where the conflict lasted from 1968-c.1993), Malaysia (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), Oman (1965-75) to name but a few. So don’t plan to be home any time soon boys.
2 Comments:
I think you dropped the phrase "democratization by intervention" in when I wasn't looking.
America didn't intervene in Iraq for the purpose of democratizing the country, and there's no reason why its success or failure should be judged by whether Iraq does or does not become democratic.
It is, however, fair to judge an occupier by whether it provides the occupied country with adequate security -- or to put it simply, whether it maintains a monopoly of force in the country.
To do so in Iraq would appear to call for a peace keeping force of some 400-500,000 troops, a minority of combat soldiers and a substantial majority of policing and rconstruction forces.
During the period of occupation -- say, a decade -- a working economic and political system can be put in place (perhaps, arising organically) to be run by an indigenous elite subject to more or less restraint exercised by the people. We shouldn't forget that 95% of humanity prizes social safety, security, and stability as do, in international affairs, 95% of all nations.
The idea that a mythical 95% of humanity prizes security is exactly what this blog is combatting. Everybody prizes security, but is it the highest prize? And what is the war in Iraq for, since democracy promotion is now a big bastion of US foreign policy towards Iraq? So the occupation should be judged by the promises told to the people of both the US and Iraq. And my dear, how do you know how many troops are necessary, will you be one of those soldiers? Or can you foresee the future to know exactly how much time it will take?
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