Begging the Question

Poking holes in the White House's 'unclassified version' of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq can be as arduous and tiring as arguing politics with the family on Thanksgiving. Despite the title, the NSRVI is essentially a PR document. (As we noted previously, it was composed in large part by Peter Feaver, special advisor to the National Security Council') It is light on detail and almost makes an art of begging the question. Nevertheless, an opportunity has arisen to make a measured assessment of the Strategy's credo: the political process brings better security, economic progress and political participation.

The latest quarterly report from the office of the Special Inspector General For Iraqi Reconstruction was released this Monday. It seems that after 18 months of effort, reconstruction remains far from completed, or even from sustainability, defined as 'the ability of a program to deliver its intended benefits for an extended period of time after major financial, managerial, and technical assistance from an external donor is terminated'.

A full $5.6 billion of the original $18.6 billion provided by Congress in 2003 has had to be reallocated in order to meet 'the new security and political situation in Iraq.' This reallocation means, for example, that only 70.5% of the planned projects in the electricity sector will be completed, and only 36% of those in the water sector. If we look at 'outputs' and 'outcomes', official-speak for the effects of completing projects and the wider benefits to Iraqi society, the initial impression of regress only deepens. Those electricity projects that are completed will not meet rising demand, and the overall deterioration of Iraq infrastructure has actually meant a decline in quality of life.

To cap it all, the report makes the following observation: 'By the end of FY 2006, the United States expects to have fully obligated the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).' (See also here.) And this just before stating: 'Based on the pace of construction project starts and completions, and the rate of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IRRF) expenditures, it is difficult to forecast with any confidence the end-date for U.S. government construction programs. With the untenable costs of an extended presence in Iraq, this becomes a critical concern and warrants further review.'

We have often argued that purely pragmatic objections about the costs of war do not amount to full political criticism. But as a response to the the administration's Strategic Objectives - 'Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services' - it is well worth pointing out the shortcomings of their best political efforts. They have failed to get their way not only in the recent Palestinian elections but also in, many ways, in Iraq, both for the same reasons. They have produced national strategy documents and policies without having a clearly defined strategy. That they have been uncertain about their aims is no less a reason to be critical, possibly more so: a power with an interest at least erects stable institutions that serve its interests. The arbitrary character of Bush's adventure has made it purely destructive.