Friday Review: Confronting the Backlash
On the fourth anniversary of 9/11 the New York Times Magazine published a lengthy article by journalist and professor Mark Danner, taking stock of the war on terror. In it he made the familiar argument that, not only had the war on terror failed to achieve its original objectives, it had in fact increased the danger of terrorism by encouraging an Islamist backlash against US policy. As Danner put it, "Al Qaeda has now become Al Qaedaism...[U]nder the American allied assault, what had been a relatively small, conspiratorial organization has mutated into a worldwide political movement, with thousands of followers eager to adopt its methods and advance its aims."
Variations of this argument are made across the political spectrum. Conservative former CIA spook, Michael Scheuer, advances it in his book, 'Imperial Hubris', while the leftist collective 'Retort' echo Danner in their book 'Afflicted Powers', claiming Al-Qaeda "appears to have transformed itself from a vanguard organization into something like a mass movement with a nearly unlimited pool of potential operatives." But such accounts are highly problematic. First, they fail to recognize the apolitical, introverted character of the radical jihadis. Second, they tend to conflate a series of different movements, which need to be differentiated in order appropriately to assess them.
In fact the jihadis of Afghanistan were never strongly connected to the Muslim societies they claim to represent. This both predates and stems from their experience of Afghanistan. Initially, a number of the key figures had been active in domestic Islamist politics around the Middle East. The failure of these movements, crushed by the states in which they took place over the 1980s and early 1990s left the leadership disenchanted with their own societies. Afghanistan allowed them to re-pose their struggle on a more cosmic level, in the grand Manichean terms of a war against the great atheist power (the Soviet Union). They no longer had to relate to the needs of the impoverished urban masses who had been their target audiences in Cairo, Algiers or Damascus. US funding of the mujahideen's war meant that they did not even have to build strong links with the local Afghan resistance. There was frequent tension between the concrete goals of the latter group and the more ephemeral aims of the Arab and South Asian jihadis who arrived in their country.
In this new cosmic jihad the individual salvation, through martyrdom, of the jihadi assumed central importance. There are many tales from the Afghan war of foreign fighters holding positions long after it became clear they were doomed and in fact begging not to be withdrawn or relieved. In his excellent study 'Landscapes of the Jihad', Faisal Devji, a professor of history at the New School for Social Research, claims that the jihad is now "more ethical than political in nature". That is to say, the actions of jihadis are not performed according to a traditional political calculation of means and ends. The symbolic character of the act has become its central purpose, rather than any specific aim it furthers or achieves. Rather than acting as political representatives of a movement or people, jihadis act as atomized consciences disclosing their inner souls.
This explains how the attacks of 9/11 could come straight out of the blue. Unlike the assault on Pearl Harbor, to which 9/11 is so often compared, there was no logic or rational calculus behind the latter. As Devji puts it "While the attacks of 9/11...were meticulously planned, they were at the same time completely speculative as far as their effects were concerned, since these could neither be predicted with any degree of certainty, nor controlled in any fashion." This stands in clear contrast to the calculations of the Japanese who, while they knew they were taking an enormous risk in attacking the US, only did so at the end of an exhaustive process of strategic consideration. Likewise the failure of Al Qaeda to claim many of their attacks, in the manner adopted by all major terrorist groups over the years, suggests an ambiguity as to their goals.
But while this might make Al Qaeda unpredictable and shocking, this is not a sign of their strength. As Devji makes clear, "[a]s the kind of acts that have moved beyond the rationality of intentions, such excesses now characterise the totality of the jihad's action, which has lost intentionality because it has lost control over its own global environment" (emphasis added). This is also a stark limitation on the likely spread of jihadi Islamism throughout the world, and has been a critical factor in its marginalized character. For the vast majority of people in the Muslim world, the jihad, with its inability to control outcomes or to guarantee any kind of results from its actions, will always be a terrifying prospect. In the form practiced by the radical Islamists, jihad can only mean chaos for those populations. These populations remain vividly aware of their lack of connection to and representation in jihadist circles.
This fact works against the popular idea that a 'backlash' against US policies is benefiting Al Qaeda's cause and leading to mass 'Al Qaedaism'. While there is no doubt widespread animus toward the US for its pursuit of two bloody wars in the Muslim world, there is little reason why this should translate into active support for the jihadis. The people of the region would no doubt rather accept the domination of the Ba'ath in Syria, National Democratic Party in Egypt, or Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, to the instability and violence of the jihad. Events in Iraq can only underscore that cynicism toward Bin Ladin and his ilk.
Indeed, even in that most extreme situation - Iraq under US occupation - it is not clear the radical jihadis have been able to make deep inroads into the local society. It has become apparent that Iraqi insurgents have begun to distance themselves from bloody and indiscriminate tactics practice by the likes of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The latest report from the International Crisis Group notes that the insurgents have become increasingly concerned about their public image. While there is nothing in the ICG report to suggest that the Iraq insurgents are about to hand Zarqawi over to the US, we might read this shift as evidence that the Iraqi Sunnis are imposing a more rigid political framework on the foreign fighters operating in their country. When the jihad is forced to contend with local actors and conditions, the ends/means calculus soon reasserts itself, as do the requirements of tailoring political action to suit the interests of those one claims to represent.
That also describes the situation facing the various reformist Islamist parties. While the controversy about the election of Hamas rages on, what is often missed is the long term drift of the party toward the mainstream, here detailed in an article by Graham Usher, veteran Occupied Territories correspondent. This is a party for whom the political landscape is fundamentally shaped by the need to meet the expectations of their constituency - for whom success will be defined in the mundane terms of utility provision and economic growth. Meanwhile far from voting on the basis of a backlash against US policy, the critical issues for the Palestinian electorate seem to have been largely internal. The same constraints act upon Hizbullah in Lebanon, or the Anavatan Partisi who form Turkey's government.
In the light of this reality, we can see just how crude the 'backlash' idea is. The picture from the region is far more complex than such a simple model could ever suggest. As we have seen, there are fundamental constraints on the growth of radical jihadism. And to conflate Al Qaeda with Hamas, or other popular Islamist parties, will undermine our ability to understand and to asses either. But not only does the backlash idea misrepresent reality, it may actually legitimize the war on terror. For if US policy were actually engendering an armed, organized opposition, many of the current security measures would be more justified. Both sides of the debate need to stop opportunistically distorting the facts to suit their own political proclivities. In overstating the threat, CIA spooks, the New York Times, and radical lefties are fanning the flames of fear and misunderstanding over here, and doing a disservice to politics over there.
Variations of this argument are made across the political spectrum. Conservative former CIA spook, Michael Scheuer, advances it in his book, 'Imperial Hubris', while the leftist collective 'Retort' echo Danner in their book 'Afflicted Powers', claiming Al-Qaeda "appears to have transformed itself from a vanguard organization into something like a mass movement with a nearly unlimited pool of potential operatives." But such accounts are highly problematic. First, they fail to recognize the apolitical, introverted character of the radical jihadis. Second, they tend to conflate a series of different movements, which need to be differentiated in order appropriately to assess them.
In fact the jihadis of Afghanistan were never strongly connected to the Muslim societies they claim to represent. This both predates and stems from their experience of Afghanistan. Initially, a number of the key figures had been active in domestic Islamist politics around the Middle East. The failure of these movements, crushed by the states in which they took place over the 1980s and early 1990s left the leadership disenchanted with their own societies. Afghanistan allowed them to re-pose their struggle on a more cosmic level, in the grand Manichean terms of a war against the great atheist power (the Soviet Union). They no longer had to relate to the needs of the impoverished urban masses who had been their target audiences in Cairo, Algiers or Damascus. US funding of the mujahideen's war meant that they did not even have to build strong links with the local Afghan resistance. There was frequent tension between the concrete goals of the latter group and the more ephemeral aims of the Arab and South Asian jihadis who arrived in their country.
In this new cosmic jihad the individual salvation, through martyrdom, of the jihadi assumed central importance. There are many tales from the Afghan war of foreign fighters holding positions long after it became clear they were doomed and in fact begging not to be withdrawn or relieved. In his excellent study 'Landscapes of the Jihad', Faisal Devji, a professor of history at the New School for Social Research, claims that the jihad is now "more ethical than political in nature". That is to say, the actions of jihadis are not performed according to a traditional political calculation of means and ends. The symbolic character of the act has become its central purpose, rather than any specific aim it furthers or achieves. Rather than acting as political representatives of a movement or people, jihadis act as atomized consciences disclosing their inner souls.
This explains how the attacks of 9/11 could come straight out of the blue. Unlike the assault on Pearl Harbor, to which 9/11 is so often compared, there was no logic or rational calculus behind the latter. As Devji puts it "While the attacks of 9/11...were meticulously planned, they were at the same time completely speculative as far as their effects were concerned, since these could neither be predicted with any degree of certainty, nor controlled in any fashion." This stands in clear contrast to the calculations of the Japanese who, while they knew they were taking an enormous risk in attacking the US, only did so at the end of an exhaustive process of strategic consideration. Likewise the failure of Al Qaeda to claim many of their attacks, in the manner adopted by all major terrorist groups over the years, suggests an ambiguity as to their goals.
But while this might make Al Qaeda unpredictable and shocking, this is not a sign of their strength. As Devji makes clear, "[a]s the kind of acts that have moved beyond the rationality of intentions, such excesses now characterise the totality of the jihad's action, which has lost intentionality because it has lost control over its own global environment" (emphasis added). This is also a stark limitation on the likely spread of jihadi Islamism throughout the world, and has been a critical factor in its marginalized character. For the vast majority of people in the Muslim world, the jihad, with its inability to control outcomes or to guarantee any kind of results from its actions, will always be a terrifying prospect. In the form practiced by the radical Islamists, jihad can only mean chaos for those populations. These populations remain vividly aware of their lack of connection to and representation in jihadist circles.
This fact works against the popular idea that a 'backlash' against US policies is benefiting Al Qaeda's cause and leading to mass 'Al Qaedaism'. While there is no doubt widespread animus toward the US for its pursuit of two bloody wars in the Muslim world, there is little reason why this should translate into active support for the jihadis. The people of the region would no doubt rather accept the domination of the Ba'ath in Syria, National Democratic Party in Egypt, or Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan, to the instability and violence of the jihad. Events in Iraq can only underscore that cynicism toward Bin Ladin and his ilk.
Indeed, even in that most extreme situation - Iraq under US occupation - it is not clear the radical jihadis have been able to make deep inroads into the local society. It has become apparent that Iraqi insurgents have begun to distance themselves from bloody and indiscriminate tactics practice by the likes of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. The latest report from the International Crisis Group notes that the insurgents have become increasingly concerned about their public image. While there is nothing in the ICG report to suggest that the Iraq insurgents are about to hand Zarqawi over to the US, we might read this shift as evidence that the Iraqi Sunnis are imposing a more rigid political framework on the foreign fighters operating in their country. When the jihad is forced to contend with local actors and conditions, the ends/means calculus soon reasserts itself, as do the requirements of tailoring political action to suit the interests of those one claims to represent.
That also describes the situation facing the various reformist Islamist parties. While the controversy about the election of Hamas rages on, what is often missed is the long term drift of the party toward the mainstream, here detailed in an article by Graham Usher, veteran Occupied Territories correspondent. This is a party for whom the political landscape is fundamentally shaped by the need to meet the expectations of their constituency - for whom success will be defined in the mundane terms of utility provision and economic growth. Meanwhile far from voting on the basis of a backlash against US policy, the critical issues for the Palestinian electorate seem to have been largely internal. The same constraints act upon Hizbullah in Lebanon, or the Anavatan Partisi who form Turkey's government.
In the light of this reality, we can see just how crude the 'backlash' idea is. The picture from the region is far more complex than such a simple model could ever suggest. As we have seen, there are fundamental constraints on the growth of radical jihadism. And to conflate Al Qaeda with Hamas, or other popular Islamist parties, will undermine our ability to understand and to asses either. But not only does the backlash idea misrepresent reality, it may actually legitimize the war on terror. For if US policy were actually engendering an armed, organized opposition, many of the current security measures would be more justified. Both sides of the debate need to stop opportunistically distorting the facts to suit their own political proclivities. In overstating the threat, CIA spooks, the New York Times, and radical lefties are fanning the flames of fear and misunderstanding over here, and doing a disservice to politics over there.
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