Sorting out Sudan

Yesterday, Bush gave a speech in which he inveighed against those who claim we are not at war. He said a "tendency of folks is to say this really isn't a war. People kind of want to slip to the comfortable." It was surprising, then, to hear Bush make a commitment in that same speech to increasing US and others' involvement in the Sudan. Bush said Sudan needed "more troops, probably under the United Nations," and did not discount the possibility of sending US military personnel. If the nation is really at war, and needs to absorb itself in preserving its security, where does it get the time, resources and energy to devote itself to humanitarian missions such as Sudan?

In fact, even in relation to Sudan, Bush has been unable to decide whether the relevant issue is humanitarianism or security. Although in his most recent speech, Bush believed the story in Darfur, the Western region in Sudan where the fighting is concentrated, to be about genocide, requiring foreign intervention and strong-arming the government and its paramilitaries, in prior diplomatic overtures, Bush has claimed the main issue in Sudan is terrorism. This has meant strengthening the hand of the central government, including negotiations and financial backing, as well as military cooperation. This Janus-faced policy reflects a deep confusion in Bush's foreign policy. In the absence of clearly defined enemies, Bush has had intense difficulty relating to any specific issue. Even with Iraq, Bush has altered his reasons for intervening, from security to democracy to genocide and back, never settling on a clearly defined argument nor consistently formulated policy. The main determining factor of Bush's foreign policy strategy seems to be how any particular diplomatic effort plays at home in the moment. Which, given some of the problems in Iraq, may be why he is testing the waters on Sudan.

The absence of a strategy does not make Bush's foreign policy any less destructive. Not only has he smashed two states in the Middle East and Central Asia, but the unpredictability of his diplomacy over time makes it difficult for actors in other countries to orient their own actions. This is clear in Sudan, where Bush has given both the central government and the rebels reasons to count on Bush and not to count on Bush. This creates a very fluid and ambiguous situation, in which the strategy's of local actors must take into account American diplomacy, by sheer dint of its strength, but find themselves unable to do so, given its fickleness. This, among others, is one of the central reasons why interventions in general, but particularly under this administration, are so problematic. Their terms and tactics are dictated by politicians' responses to home populations, not as representatives of those who are subject to intervention.