All Eyes on China
Each side having been driven into the corner by the other, the punitive phase of the stand-off over Iran’s nuclear ambitions has begun. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as interlocutor to the conflict, last week referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council, thereby pronouncing dead any existing basis on which to find a compromise. Russia, more conciliatory than the usual brokerage firm of the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany), has had its latest offer rejected by Iran. At this point, the two other essential members of the cast take center stage: the United States and China.
There is no “go it alone” rhetoric to hustle everyone along this time around. Post-Iraq, the US strategy has been to allow diplomacy to run its course. This has been demanded by the EU-3 and Russia just as much as it has been welcomed by the US, neither side wanting a pre-mature repeat of the Iraq debacle. Indeed, due to Russia and China’s unwillingness to impose sanctions on Iran at this point, the United States has voluntarily tempered the frenetic pace at which freedom tends to march, seeking only a consensus statement from the Security Council that Iran should halt its nuclear enrichment. Such is the demoralizing effect of Iraq as the western powers begin to confront Iran directly.
Nevertheless, the gravity of the moment should not be under-stated. Iran remains committed to researching technology for nuclear power and developing nuclear material to that end. This it regards as its sovereign right and is quick to point out the seeming double standard by which Western policy is calibrated. Further, Iran has mumbled a thing or two about possibly pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), as well as using its considerable influence over world oil supply as a political lever should it become necessary.
American opposition has continued apace. Standing in front of the American and Israeli flags, Dick Cheney recently told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee that, "The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences." In deliberating on what “meaningful” means, nothing, it seems, is “off the table,” including a military strike. Beyond that, of course, is the recent blitz of democracy spending awarded to the State Department for tinkering in Iran. Although it must wait patiently as diplomacy turns and turns, and even as displeasure with the Bush Administration grows, the United States can rely on a significant amount of domestic anxiety so far as Iran is concerned.
So far, so good. The wild card, however, is China. Along with Pakistan, China is reeling from the recent nuclear deal between the United States and India. That deal, in all but name, is designed as a deterrent to China’s regional ambitions, both economic and military. In short, due to the substantial shift in nuclear policy that the US-India deal represents, China now has a probable incentive to defend Iran’s sovereign right to develop nuclear technology in the Security Council.
Through the US-Indian deal, the Bush Administration has demonstrated its willingness to depart from a rules-based approach to non-proliferation in favor of a more pragmatic good actor v. bad actor model. Good actors (read: US-approved), even those who are not signatories to the NNPT, like India, may have, basically, any nuclear program they want. Bad actors (“rogue states” or, of course, terrorists) get nothing.
As George Perkovich writes, from the point-of-view of the Bush Administration, “The established global nonproliferation regime is predicated on rules that do not sufficiently discriminate between bad actors and good actors. Universal equal compliance with rules will never happen because bad guys will always exist and cheat. The objective should be not to constrain or burden good actors, including the United States and India, but rather to concentrate power on removing or nullifying bad actors. If negotiation and enforcement processes are hung up on equal treatment and mutual obligations, they are a waste of time and political capital.”
The problem is that China can also play this game. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it is in a good position to possibly rectify the recent setback over India through some measure of support for Iran. China faces a dilemma here: while Iran is a vitally important trading partner for China (particularly where energy is concerned), its economic influence does not compare with that of the United States. If forced to support some sort of punitive measure against Iran, China might endanger a crucial source of energy. If it resists those measures, it risks the ire of Washington. (It could, of course, abstain – as it often does – but it would still be obliged to comply with any punitive measures.)
Before the nuclear deal between the United States and India, China was in a bind over Iran. But after discovering that the world’s most populous good actor (India) is to be used as a buffer against its own interests, China now has one more reason to side with Iran against the United States. Whether it does or not will depend on developments in the coming days. But in a sign of things to come, Iran seems to be making an about-face in its approach to the Security Council, and it would be hard to imagine that it does not have China in mind.
There is no “go it alone” rhetoric to hustle everyone along this time around. Post-Iraq, the US strategy has been to allow diplomacy to run its course. This has been demanded by the EU-3 and Russia just as much as it has been welcomed by the US, neither side wanting a pre-mature repeat of the Iraq debacle. Indeed, due to Russia and China’s unwillingness to impose sanctions on Iran at this point, the United States has voluntarily tempered the frenetic pace at which freedom tends to march, seeking only a consensus statement from the Security Council that Iran should halt its nuclear enrichment. Such is the demoralizing effect of Iraq as the western powers begin to confront Iran directly.
Nevertheless, the gravity of the moment should not be under-stated. Iran remains committed to researching technology for nuclear power and developing nuclear material to that end. This it regards as its sovereign right and is quick to point out the seeming double standard by which Western policy is calibrated. Further, Iran has mumbled a thing or two about possibly pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), as well as using its considerable influence over world oil supply as a political lever should it become necessary.
American opposition has continued apace. Standing in front of the American and Israeli flags, Dick Cheney recently told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee that, "The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences." In deliberating on what “meaningful” means, nothing, it seems, is “off the table,” including a military strike. Beyond that, of course, is the recent blitz of democracy spending awarded to the State Department for tinkering in Iran. Although it must wait patiently as diplomacy turns and turns, and even as displeasure with the Bush Administration grows, the United States can rely on a significant amount of domestic anxiety so far as Iran is concerned.
So far, so good. The wild card, however, is China. Along with Pakistan, China is reeling from the recent nuclear deal between the United States and India. That deal, in all but name, is designed as a deterrent to China’s regional ambitions, both economic and military. In short, due to the substantial shift in nuclear policy that the US-India deal represents, China now has a probable incentive to defend Iran’s sovereign right to develop nuclear technology in the Security Council.
Through the US-Indian deal, the Bush Administration has demonstrated its willingness to depart from a rules-based approach to non-proliferation in favor of a more pragmatic good actor v. bad actor model. Good actors (read: US-approved), even those who are not signatories to the NNPT, like India, may have, basically, any nuclear program they want. Bad actors (“rogue states” or, of course, terrorists) get nothing.
As George Perkovich writes, from the point-of-view of the Bush Administration, “The established global nonproliferation regime is predicated on rules that do not sufficiently discriminate between bad actors and good actors. Universal equal compliance with rules will never happen because bad guys will always exist and cheat. The objective should be not to constrain or burden good actors, including the United States and India, but rather to concentrate power on removing or nullifying bad actors. If negotiation and enforcement processes are hung up on equal treatment and mutual obligations, they are a waste of time and political capital.”
The problem is that China can also play this game. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it is in a good position to possibly rectify the recent setback over India through some measure of support for Iran. China faces a dilemma here: while Iran is a vitally important trading partner for China (particularly where energy is concerned), its economic influence does not compare with that of the United States. If forced to support some sort of punitive measure against Iran, China might endanger a crucial source of energy. If it resists those measures, it risks the ire of Washington. (It could, of course, abstain – as it often does – but it would still be obliged to comply with any punitive measures.)
Before the nuclear deal between the United States and India, China was in a bind over Iran. But after discovering that the world’s most populous good actor (India) is to be used as a buffer against its own interests, China now has one more reason to side with Iran against the United States. Whether it does or not will depend on developments in the coming days. But in a sign of things to come, Iran seems to be making an about-face in its approach to the Security Council, and it would be hard to imagine that it does not have China in mind.
2 Comments:
Perkovich, another manipulative apologist and hack.
Could there be, in the current world situation, a worse state 'actor' than the US?
Let's not get 'hung up' on 'equal treatment,' right. Let's also not admit the role that prior unequal treatment has had on proliferation. And let's not even ackowledge Israel's programs.
And let's of course simply brush away the many ways in which the US (under this and previous presidents) has both stimulated proliferation and failed to honor its own obligations under NPT.
Our agression makes the USA an unconscionably bad actor -- that Perkovich can raise such 'standards' without being ridiculed definitely stains the legitimacy of the Carnegie Endowment.
For the record, in the cited article, Perkovich takes a rather ambivalent view of the US-India nuclear deal. He mentions various problems with the Bush Administration's approach:
1. The deal contradicts the Administration's own assessments that proliferation is a mjaor concern.
2. The deal sets precedents for China to seek similar rule changes that could erode US influence in the future.
3. The government "undervalues" the effectiveness of the rules-based system and underestimates the downside of the US-India deal.
4. While economic development is most needed for India, the deal focuses on weapons development and military co-operation - an inversion of priorities.
5. India's "capacity and willingness" to act as a buffer to China are not sufficient for the United States to rely upon.
6. US co-operation with India will not, in the end, buy lasting partnership.
As with many such commentators and analysts, the problem is one of pragmatism. We have argued extensively on the blog that one of the great errors infecting American political analysis these days is the "if it were legal (viable), then it would be okay." Perkovich's approach falls short because it is not a principled political objection and, therefore, would have no basis to oppose such a deal were the Bush Administration to circumvent those six problems above.
But his analysis is certainly not fawning, and he is not a hack. That he does not mention US aggression is a serious omission, and we agree that any complete analysis would have to include that. But his assessments are valuable, and it is important not to dismiss them out of hand.
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