Lobbies Lobbies Everywhere

Last week, two well-known professors, one from Harvard and the other from the University of Chicago, published a paper called ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’ which has caused a serious furor amongst the chattering classes. The basic argument is that supporting Israel is not in the U.S.’s interest, so the only explanation for the massive financial and diplomatic support the U.S. gives that country is an Israel Lobby that wields disproportionate influence. As usual with these mini-controversies, it has shed more heat than light. But there are a few responses to this argument that are noteworthy.

First, there is the inevitable counterargument that it’s not the Israel Lobby but the Oil Lobby that is the major force behind American foreign policy in the Middle East. Perhaps it is surprising that more hasn’t been made of this argument, given how widely the Oil Lobby argument predominated during the peak of the war discussions. Even Bush has argued that dependence upon oil is a major problem for America! The Israel Lobby argument is even more farfetched as an explanation of foreign policy than the Oil Lobby argument. But both reflect a quest for conspiratorial explanations of politics that have quietist implications. If such lobbies really are in control, then what possibility is there for political opposition? One can complain about lobbies, but if the levers of power are tucked away in back rooms, telephone lines and special relationships, then there is no real possibility of reclaiming control. The implications of this argument are not critical but passive. And the fact that arguments about the two lobbies are not seen to contradict one another is significant—this is an instinctual reaction to politics, not a set of reasoned arguments.

Second, in this superb critique of the Israel Lobby paper, Joseph Massad points out that the argument is not only irrational, but apologetic towards American imperialism. Holding the Israel Lobby responsible for American foreign policy

‘exonerates the United States' government from all the responsibility and guilt that it deserves for its policies in the Arab world and gives false hope to many Arabs and Palestinians who wish America would be on their side instead of on the side of their enemies.’

When, after all, has American policy supported a progressive government in the Middle East or elsewhere? And American support for Israel has served many US interests, for such reactionary purposes as keeping the U.S.’s Arab clients guessing, as well as a kind of moral bludgeon with which to guilt trip Europe about its genocidal past. Massad mentions a number of other ways the U.S. gains from the relationship. The point isn’t merely that the ‘Israel Lobby’ argument has a narrow view of American interests. It is also that these wag the dog theories let the master off the hook.