Occupiers Behind Bars
If Bush is leaving to future presidents just how to extract the country from Iraq, one thing he's decided to do while he's still (nominally) in charge is build massive bases. The U.S. may be winding down its reconstruction projects -- with the only new money going to prison cells -- but Washington has authorized $1 billion dollars for military construction. The purpose: to consolidate massive bases like Anaconda in Balad (already over 2 million cubic feet and home to 120 helicopters) and to expand numerous other installations, which were military hubs under Saddam.
As American soldiers pull back from the cities, such fortifications are going up in remote locations of Iraq, and like al-Asad in the western desert amount to huge concrete cities. According to the AP, "17,000 troops and workers come and go in a kind of bustling American town, with a Burger King, Pizza Hut, and a car dealership, stop signs, traffice regulations, and young bikers clogging the roads." Asked whether the U.S. is in Iraq to stay, one young soldier at the base in Balad responded, "I think we'll be here forever."
The scope of these militaries cities is remarkable for two reasons. First, it reinforces just how physically and politically isolated the U.S. has become. CPA officials under Grand Vizier Bremer famously referred to their headquarters in Baghdad as the Green Zone, and the area outside the blast walls (i.e. all of Iraq) as the Red Zone. The Green Zone/Red Zone divide underscored the utter lack of control CPA officials exerted over their own occupation. In a sense, these bases -- intended to provide the military with a modicum of normalcy -- speak to the same predicament. By retreating from where power and politics operates in Iraq to isolated corners behind impenetrable concrete, the U.S. is simply highlighting its inability assert authority over the country. America is now primarily a witness, imposing a facade of calm for its soldiers while staggering from event to event and utterly disconnected from the real Iraq, the Red Zone.
Rather than suggesting clear, long-term designs, the bases are also a perfect embodiment of the Administration's short-term, reactive thinking -- doing what it takes at the moment to insulate the occupation from the very consequences of its actions (the violence and uncertainty all around it). The Administration has been repeatedly accused of having nefarious geostrategic plans for the country, of which these bases are considered tangible proof -- clearly at least some soldiers seem to think we're "in country" for good. And certainly, one of the hopes of a successful Iraq War was the idea of employing Iraq as a military outpost in the region -- one friendlier and more secure than Saudia Arabia.
Yet, at this point, perhaps why the military is so coy in telling us what the future plans are for the bases is because they really don't know. American politics may call an end to the whole fiasco by the end of this year. In other words, there is no conspiracy because the conspirators have no idea what their plans are. If miraculously a stable and pliable Iraq emerges, the original goal for such bases may be implemented -- but nobody's holding their breath. For the time being, the military construction is just further proof of action without policy or ultimate purpose. Like the creation of the Green Zone, the bases are part of an unreality the U.S. hopes to impose on Iraq -- and if that unreality can't work for the country at least it can exist behind the concrete for the administrators.
As American soldiers pull back from the cities, such fortifications are going up in remote locations of Iraq, and like al-Asad in the western desert amount to huge concrete cities. According to the AP, "17,000 troops and workers come and go in a kind of bustling American town, with a Burger King, Pizza Hut, and a car dealership, stop signs, traffice regulations, and young bikers clogging the roads." Asked whether the U.S. is in Iraq to stay, one young soldier at the base in Balad responded, "I think we'll be here forever."
The scope of these militaries cities is remarkable for two reasons. First, it reinforces just how physically and politically isolated the U.S. has become. CPA officials under Grand Vizier Bremer famously referred to their headquarters in Baghdad as the Green Zone, and the area outside the blast walls (i.e. all of Iraq) as the Red Zone. The Green Zone/Red Zone divide underscored the utter lack of control CPA officials exerted over their own occupation. In a sense, these bases -- intended to provide the military with a modicum of normalcy -- speak to the same predicament. By retreating from where power and politics operates in Iraq to isolated corners behind impenetrable concrete, the U.S. is simply highlighting its inability assert authority over the country. America is now primarily a witness, imposing a facade of calm for its soldiers while staggering from event to event and utterly disconnected from the real Iraq, the Red Zone.
Rather than suggesting clear, long-term designs, the bases are also a perfect embodiment of the Administration's short-term, reactive thinking -- doing what it takes at the moment to insulate the occupation from the very consequences of its actions (the violence and uncertainty all around it). The Administration has been repeatedly accused of having nefarious geostrategic plans for the country, of which these bases are considered tangible proof -- clearly at least some soldiers seem to think we're "in country" for good. And certainly, one of the hopes of a successful Iraq War was the idea of employing Iraq as a military outpost in the region -- one friendlier and more secure than Saudia Arabia.
Yet, at this point, perhaps why the military is so coy in telling us what the future plans are for the bases is because they really don't know. American politics may call an end to the whole fiasco by the end of this year. In other words, there is no conspiracy because the conspirators have no idea what their plans are. If miraculously a stable and pliable Iraq emerges, the original goal for such bases may be implemented -- but nobody's holding their breath. For the time being, the military construction is just further proof of action without policy or ultimate purpose. Like the creation of the Green Zone, the bases are part of an unreality the U.S. hopes to impose on Iraq -- and if that unreality can't work for the country at least it can exist behind the concrete for the administrators.

4 Comments:
. . . the bases are also a perfect embodiment of the Administration's short-term, reactive thinking . . . .
It seems to me that, given current administration strategy, constructing over-the-horizon Murtha-esque air bases should be expected.
If Iraqi armed forces begin fighting the insurgency, it will be our policy to support them with tactical air power. Given the range of Apaches and Chinooks, the bases must be located within Iraq and given the primary goal of force protection, at some distance from likely insurgent strongholds. And that's where they're being built.
I would disagree with ellen1910. The permanent bases were always the main objective of this war. All other reasons are cover stories. The oil regions of the Middle East are the most strategically important regions in the world. Pre-invasion, there were strong efforts to get US military bases out of Saudi Arabia (one of the big reasons OBL gave for the 9/11 attacks). An invasion of Iraq (even then it was known to be an essentially defenseless country) would to intimidate the region and provide permanent military bases and a puppet government to continue that intimidation until the oil ran out (at least that was how the fantasy went). This administration was incapable of even achieving this cynical goal.
If permanent bases to secure oil were the objective, why the zealous insistence on maintaining the country intact? A breakup would have been more to the point, with a friendly Kurdish state in the north inviting bases that would secure the Kirkuk oilfields, and a vulnerable Shiite state with its capital in Basra accepting "protection" and indispensable technical assistance to pump oil from the southern fields. This could have been achieved in 1991, but such a policy was explicitly rejected at the time. It remains, arguably, an easier route to resumption of oil delivery than the present course, which must therefore have a different rationale.
Keeping the country intact was part of the strategy because of what would happen with balkanization (which is what we are actually seeing happen now). Shiites in the south with significant religious overlap with Iran, are reaching out to their neighbor to create a more unified block of common interests thus empowering Iran in the region. The Kurds to the north if allowed to act independently, will add more problems to the already unstable Kurdish areas of Turkey that border Iraq, which is bad for EU and American investors in Turkey. The major oil fields are in the north and the south, leaving the powerless baathists in the middle without oil and unlikely to accept losing out on the trillions of dollars that oil represents. This is not part of the model of stability the neo-cons dreamed of in their fantasies. GHW Bush saw the nightmare this would become and chose not to move into Bagdad in 1991 (hanging the Kurds out to dry in the process). His son was not so bright.
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