Al Qaeda Season 5

With each new communique from Al Qaeda, its irrelevance and isolation increases. The latest audio tape from Osama Bin Laden is no exception. He calls on Sudan (from which he and Al Qaeda were unceremoniously expelled in 1996) to wage a “long war against the Crusader plunderers” in the western regions of the country. The Sudanese Foreign Ministry flatly declared that “Sudan has nothing to do with such statements.”

A recent pep-broadcast to the newly elected government in Palestine by the more eloquent No. 2 man in Al Qaeda, al-Zawahiri, had the same effect. Reminding Hamas to continue the struggle against Israel at all costs, he suggested that the new government throw out all of the “surrender accords” made between the previous “secular” government and Israel. Khaled Meshaal, in a public rebuff, said that he would not be told what to do by Al Qaeda, and had no need of its advice.

The Washington Post notes that factional disputes within the fundamentalist movement have increased. “The schisms are reflected in Zawahiri’s many speeches, in which he has attempted to assert influence over a host of seemingly unrelated issues: the war in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, elections in Egypt, oil production in Saudi Arabia and obscure questions of Muslim theology.” Stretched beyond the limit of his portfolio, Zawahiri and Al Qaeda are losing credibility among their fellow travelers.

It is the decentralized nature of Al Qaeda that has allowed such splintering to occur. In the face of Zawahiri’s relentless criticism of Islamic parties throughout the Middle East taking part in any western-style elections, strong Islamic showings in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as the mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have given fresh impetus to local movements. Even militants like Zarqawi in Iraq disagree openly with Zawahiri.

That Al Qaeda’s limited influence is waning even further is no secret. Bruce Hoffman, of the Rand Corp., says of Bin Laden’s latest broadcast: “He’s got to say something about someplace. They’ve got to keep talking or else they’re going to be irrelevant, especially when they’re not directly involved in the fighting.”

Daniel Drezner, sober blogger that he is, asks the question outright: “[I]f there is no spectacular terrorist attack in the next year – on a par, say, with either the London or Madrid bombings – is it safe to say that the threat from Al Qaeda should be seriously downgraded?”

By mentioning the independently orchestrated attacks in London and Madrid, Drezner begs the question by assuming that the objective threat of Al Qaeda has been rationally quantified up to this point. He is on to something, but why wait a year? How big must the attack be to justify continued stress over Al Qaeda? As we have previously said, the magnitude, imminence and likelihood of terrorist attacks have never been factors in the logic of the War on Terror, and questions like this really have very little to do with Al Qaeda's continued popularity on the airwaves.

Dennis Perrin gets it right. Osama's status is that of a celebrity and his shtick is to launch invective against crusaders and Zionists. Just as when our major Hollywood role-models wax rhapsodic on some social matter or other, we are all sure to see it on the front pages, no matter how irrelevant their opinions may be to our lives, so too Osama. As Perrin says, "[T]here remain plenty who are content with the crazed villain scenario, and the major media in hand with the government will continue to screen this until it is no longer useful, though, I'm afraid, it'll be very useful for some time to come."