A World Annual State Terror Report?
Fred Halliday usually can be counted on for sharp, original insights into Middle Eastern politics. Arabia Without Sultans, for example, still stands as one of the best books on Saudi Arabia; his Making of the Second Cold War remains in various ways unsurpassed; and in recent years he has peppered the public sphere with a series of commentaries on Islam and the West, the Middle East in international relations, and September 11. So it is no surprise that a recent essay of Halliday’s opens with a series of cutting observations about the faux-professionalism of the ‘terrorism industry,’ its one-sided approach to the issue, as well as an unusually nuanced analysis of terrorism.
We were perplexed, however, to find that what begins as a critique of ‘the group of experts from universities, government and policy institutes’ concludes with a call for a ‘World Annual State Terror Report’. What kind of a critique ends by arguing for an internationalization of an industry that basically should be shut down? What is the logical process that moves from criticism to institutionalization? It is important to unpack this logic because Halliday is representative of a specific way of thinking that is common in progressive intellectual circles.
He starts with the legitimate, even if commonplace, point that terrorism is not a movement but a tactic: ‘Terrorism is not a movement or an environmental trend but a tactic used for political ends.’ This means it has to be analyzed contextually, and different movements distinguished conceptually. Halliday’s next move is to distinguish between national and transnational terrorism, pointing out that national groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have been moving away from terrorist tactics, while transnational groups look like they may be becoming more dangerous. Halliday’s argument, here, makes some useful distinctions, and does clear some waters.
However, he has also been seduced by the power of a trendy word – transnationalism – into thinking that he has already one-upped the simple minded experts of the terrorism industry who see only a terrorist monolith. Having sub-divided, Halliday then goes in for the kill with a final, ‘progressive’ step of logic. He reminds us that terrorism is also committed by states: ‘the denial of the violence of states themselves, and the failure to register and evaluate this violence, reflects a larger crisis of moral and political imagination.’ Halliday is caught up in a web of progressive humanitarian ideas, in which attacking ‘state-centered thinking’, and coming up with new ways of exposing the moral depredations of states, is taken for critique. That is why his conclusion is not to attack the war on terror directly, but rather to adopt and expand the category of terrorism for seemingly critical purposes:
‘The most important conclusion, for practical politics and for its study alike, is that we need to measure the incidence of killing, beating, torture, illegal detention and humiliation by states – the United States, Britain, Russia and Israel included – as much as to measure the bombs and other depredations of terrorists. We need a World Annual State Terror Report to set against the crimes of al-Qaida and its associates. It would not be difficult to compile; but, in the current political and moral climate of the western world, it is rather improbable.’
By making Halliday’s arguments seem marginal and unpopular, the last sentence gives the essay its critical cast, but this is only an appearance. Internationalizing the terrorism industry, reinterpreting terrorism in light of trendy international relations concepts, and branding Western states ‘terrorist’ hardly provides an alternative. If anything, it uncritically relies on the emotive force of the word terrorism, and plays on the underlying politics of fear driving the war on terror itself. Adding up atrocities on all sides, and weighing the numbers, is not really a political argument. It doesn’t tell us whether one side might nonetheless have a political project worth supporting. Surely there are higher standards by which to judge state policies than how many times they show up on an annual state terror report. And surely there are better arguments against the war on terror than that it doesn’t take into account state-terrorism.
We were perplexed, however, to find that what begins as a critique of ‘the group of experts from universities, government and policy institutes’ concludes with a call for a ‘World Annual State Terror Report’. What kind of a critique ends by arguing for an internationalization of an industry that basically should be shut down? What is the logical process that moves from criticism to institutionalization? It is important to unpack this logic because Halliday is representative of a specific way of thinking that is common in progressive intellectual circles.
He starts with the legitimate, even if commonplace, point that terrorism is not a movement but a tactic: ‘Terrorism is not a movement or an environmental trend but a tactic used for political ends.’ This means it has to be analyzed contextually, and different movements distinguished conceptually. Halliday’s next move is to distinguish between national and transnational terrorism, pointing out that national groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have been moving away from terrorist tactics, while transnational groups look like they may be becoming more dangerous. Halliday’s argument, here, makes some useful distinctions, and does clear some waters.
However, he has also been seduced by the power of a trendy word – transnationalism – into thinking that he has already one-upped the simple minded experts of the terrorism industry who see only a terrorist monolith. Having sub-divided, Halliday then goes in for the kill with a final, ‘progressive’ step of logic. He reminds us that terrorism is also committed by states: ‘the denial of the violence of states themselves, and the failure to register and evaluate this violence, reflects a larger crisis of moral and political imagination.’ Halliday is caught up in a web of progressive humanitarian ideas, in which attacking ‘state-centered thinking’, and coming up with new ways of exposing the moral depredations of states, is taken for critique. That is why his conclusion is not to attack the war on terror directly, but rather to adopt and expand the category of terrorism for seemingly critical purposes:
‘The most important conclusion, for practical politics and for its study alike, is that we need to measure the incidence of killing, beating, torture, illegal detention and humiliation by states – the United States, Britain, Russia and Israel included – as much as to measure the bombs and other depredations of terrorists. We need a World Annual State Terror Report to set against the crimes of al-Qaida and its associates. It would not be difficult to compile; but, in the current political and moral climate of the western world, it is rather improbable.’
By making Halliday’s arguments seem marginal and unpopular, the last sentence gives the essay its critical cast, but this is only an appearance. Internationalizing the terrorism industry, reinterpreting terrorism in light of trendy international relations concepts, and branding Western states ‘terrorist’ hardly provides an alternative. If anything, it uncritically relies on the emotive force of the word terrorism, and plays on the underlying politics of fear driving the war on terror itself. Adding up atrocities on all sides, and weighing the numbers, is not really a political argument. It doesn’t tell us whether one side might nonetheless have a political project worth supporting. Surely there are higher standards by which to judge state policies than how many times they show up on an annual state terror report. And surely there are better arguments against the war on terror than that it doesn’t take into account state-terrorism.
3 Comments:
Following AWOT, closely, Halliday points out that we cannot have a "war on terror," because terror is a tactic, only (the dive bombing analogy). But his argument implies that we can have a "War on Terror," because Terror can be (is?) defined as organizations, howsomever small and singular, who admit to or are charged with a willingness to employ terror in accomplishing their goals.
His beef seems to be with the current methodolgy of the "terror industry" whose counting of incidents of terror does not tell us much about how we're doing in the "War on Terror."
Halliday's concluding recommendation, though, does not seem to follow on his argument and appears to be a leap, a leap which probably does not deserve a weighty criticism.
If it were true that Halliday accidentally ended up in a bad place after a good argument, then we would agree. But Halliday is representative of a very common way of thinking amongst progressives and liberals. The passion of 'transnational processes' and for a moralistic critique of the state, leads to the antipolitical position we describe. The proposal ends up vindicating the transnational liberal elites ensconced in their various NGOs producing their moral condemnations of human rights violators everywhere, and seeking to limit political violence of all varieties regardless of the cause, aim or justification. This is not just Halliday's idiosyncratic position, but a standard criticism of the war on terror and terrorism itself. So even if Halliday does helpfully remind us that terrorism is a tactic, and so a war on terror makes no sense, it is not a logical leap for him to prescribe the world report. It follows from the fact that he sees all political violence through a human rights lens, and prefers the elite politics of international NGOs for the mass politics of the state.
I must applaud the editors' scathing remarks about a current mode of thinking from intellectual elites on matters of foreign policy, and would like to add that this school of thought seems to be just an extension of in inner struggle to define a viable criticism of who the actual players on the newly globalized world.
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