A Victory for France
Everyone has seized on the fragile UN resolution as an opportunity to claim victory. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has claimed that his side achieved a “historic strategic victory” against Israel. Yet Hezbollah is in many ways in a tighter spot than before. It will be far more difficult for it to operate as independently as it had been now that 15,000 Lebanese soldiers will be paired with the same number of foreign troops. Moreover, it is equally possible that it will be at least partially blamed, at least by non-Shia elements in Lebanon, for having brought Israeli wrath down on Lebanese civilians. Indeed, if public opinion swung quickly towards Hezbollah during the initial bombing, once a cease-fire seemed possible, it was just as likely that it would turn against Hezbollah for unnecessarily prolonging a conflict. This must have been at least one reason why Nasrallah, despite defiant comments about the international community, was quick to accept the UN resolution. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government has shown itself to be helpless to defend its own country and incapable of decisive action.
Ehud Olmert, Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, also claimed this as a victory for his side, but even rhetorically his doubts were apparent. Facing internal criticism that he had not done enough, and external criticism for the disproportionate use of force and deaths of Lebanese civilians, Olmert was forced to acknowledge that the resolution leaves his government in an ambiguous spot:
"We don't plan to apologize," Olmert said. He said Israel will continue to pursue Hezbollah "everywhere and at all times. We have no intention of asking anyone's permission."
In fact, as the peace settles in, Israel will only be cast in a worse light, as the sheer scale of destruction becomes apparent, and as attention focuses on the hundreds of thousands of refugees, body counts, and reconstruction of Lebanon. No clear strategic objectives have been achieved, not even, it appears, the stated goal of disarming Hezbollah, which remains an unresolved part of the UN mission.
President Bush, too, has come out as indecisive and unable to claim the moral high ground. In fact, the White House could not even get its message straight as to whether the resolution reflected a victory for general humanitarian principles or for a particular side of the conflict. When White House Spokesman Tony Snow was “Asked who had won the conflict, Snow said, ‘diplomacy has won.’” But President Bush claims it was a victory for Israel. The confusion about the significance of the ceasefire only reflects the deeper confusion and hesitancy that beset the administration from the outset. Having spent prior diplomacy forcing Syria out of Lebanon in the name of Lebanese sovereignty, it was embarrassing for Bush to end up defending Israel’s violation of the same. In addition, Bush has burned so many bridges in the Middle East and internationally over the past five years that from the beginning he was incapable of playing anything like a mediating role. Bush’s support for Israel reflected less a decisive stance than a default position into which he fell for lack of any clearer sense of how to approach the situation. He seems to have hoped that Israel’s war might revive his own war on terror by proxy.
It is into this vacuum that France stepped. Unlike Bush, France was able to leverage its ties to Lebanon, and its relative credibility, into a broadly accepted mediating role. Not only did it take the lead on the UN diplomacy, it has also promised to contribute its own troops, which even more profoundly signals France’s effort to claim ownership of the UN resolution. This is not the first time France has taken advantage of Bush’s diplomatic weakness. The joint peace-keeping operation in Haiti in 2004 involved the unprecedented violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which basically outlines the United States’ unilateral claim to the sole right to send troops to the Western Hemisphere any South or Central American nation. The Bush administration’s acceptance of French peacekeepers in Haiti was a thinly veiled attempt by the powers to mend fences, and tacit admission of weakness by Bush. This time, France has clearly dominated the ‘cooperative effort’. While Bush cannot even decide where exactly he stands on the resolution, France continues to push for the ceasefire, and to prepare troops for the pending operations. As the BBC summarizes it, not only has France “emerged with increased influence” but it has done so without having to abandon its “its philosophical opposition to the Bush administration.”
However, if France has won a victory, it is a strange victory indeed. For France is able to claim victory because it was the party best able to appear like it had no stake in the conflict whatsoever – it was most able to don the mantle of disinterested mediator. In other words, France has been able to elevate its status by presenting itself as if it has no interest in the situation. France’s victory is, in this way, a victory for the politics of posture, which, despite all the violence and bloodshed, dominated this war, over the politics of substance. France’s victory relies on it not pursuing anything more than a burnishing of its diplomatic image. Even this victory, then, is self-limiting. Chirac can only take credit up to a point, before which it becomes transparent that he, too, is instrumentalizing the conflict for his own political gain. The more Chirac appears a specifically French statesman, the less he can appear as a neutral humanitarian diplomat. For all the violence, bloodshed, and grandstanding, no party seems to have gained much by the start or the end of this conflict.
Ehud Olmert, Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, also claimed this as a victory for his side, but even rhetorically his doubts were apparent. Facing internal criticism that he had not done enough, and external criticism for the disproportionate use of force and deaths of Lebanese civilians, Olmert was forced to acknowledge that the resolution leaves his government in an ambiguous spot:
"We don't plan to apologize," Olmert said. He said Israel will continue to pursue Hezbollah "everywhere and at all times. We have no intention of asking anyone's permission."
In fact, as the peace settles in, Israel will only be cast in a worse light, as the sheer scale of destruction becomes apparent, and as attention focuses on the hundreds of thousands of refugees, body counts, and reconstruction of Lebanon. No clear strategic objectives have been achieved, not even, it appears, the stated goal of disarming Hezbollah, which remains an unresolved part of the UN mission.
President Bush, too, has come out as indecisive and unable to claim the moral high ground. In fact, the White House could not even get its message straight as to whether the resolution reflected a victory for general humanitarian principles or for a particular side of the conflict. When White House Spokesman Tony Snow was “Asked who had won the conflict, Snow said, ‘diplomacy has won.’” But President Bush claims it was a victory for Israel. The confusion about the significance of the ceasefire only reflects the deeper confusion and hesitancy that beset the administration from the outset. Having spent prior diplomacy forcing Syria out of Lebanon in the name of Lebanese sovereignty, it was embarrassing for Bush to end up defending Israel’s violation of the same. In addition, Bush has burned so many bridges in the Middle East and internationally over the past five years that from the beginning he was incapable of playing anything like a mediating role. Bush’s support for Israel reflected less a decisive stance than a default position into which he fell for lack of any clearer sense of how to approach the situation. He seems to have hoped that Israel’s war might revive his own war on terror by proxy.
It is into this vacuum that France stepped. Unlike Bush, France was able to leverage its ties to Lebanon, and its relative credibility, into a broadly accepted mediating role. Not only did it take the lead on the UN diplomacy, it has also promised to contribute its own troops, which even more profoundly signals France’s effort to claim ownership of the UN resolution. This is not the first time France has taken advantage of Bush’s diplomatic weakness. The joint peace-keeping operation in Haiti in 2004 involved the unprecedented violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which basically outlines the United States’ unilateral claim to the sole right to send troops to the Western Hemisphere any South or Central American nation. The Bush administration’s acceptance of French peacekeepers in Haiti was a thinly veiled attempt by the powers to mend fences, and tacit admission of weakness by Bush. This time, France has clearly dominated the ‘cooperative effort’. While Bush cannot even decide where exactly he stands on the resolution, France continues to push for the ceasefire, and to prepare troops for the pending operations. As the BBC summarizes it, not only has France “emerged with increased influence” but it has done so without having to abandon its “its philosophical opposition to the Bush administration.”
However, if France has won a victory, it is a strange victory indeed. For France is able to claim victory because it was the party best able to appear like it had no stake in the conflict whatsoever – it was most able to don the mantle of disinterested mediator. In other words, France has been able to elevate its status by presenting itself as if it has no interest in the situation. France’s victory is, in this way, a victory for the politics of posture, which, despite all the violence and bloodshed, dominated this war, over the politics of substance. France’s victory relies on it not pursuing anything more than a burnishing of its diplomatic image. Even this victory, then, is self-limiting. Chirac can only take credit up to a point, before which it becomes transparent that he, too, is instrumentalizing the conflict for his own political gain. The more Chirac appears a specifically French statesman, the less he can appear as a neutral humanitarian diplomat. For all the violence, bloodshed, and grandstanding, no party seems to have gained much by the start or the end of this conflict.
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