Is it an Iraq Study Group or an America Study Group?

Last week the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, led by James Baker, announced its findings, most of which would have been fairly obvious to anyone following events in Iraq. The situation is "grave." Check. The administration should employ diplomacy. Okay. There are no easy answers. Good to know. Along with engaging Syria and Iran, the heart of the recommendations appear to be speeding up the training of Iraqi police and military, and withdrawing American combat troops by early 2008. The hope is that by then Iraq will somehow have a national army that can maintain control over the various militias and insurgent groups.

There are many things that are troubling about the commission and its findings. First of the all, the very idea that important political decisions must wait until after elections and should be directed by unelected and isolated bodies of wise men is at root undemocratic. As we've commented before, the willingness to revert to commissions to solve tricky political questions further undermines the ability of ordinary citizens to control policy. Baker and company should not be the ones making life and death decisions about foreign affairs. No one elected them, and they represent no political constituency.

Yet, perhaps the most disturbing element of the ISG report is that its basic focus is not Iraq at all. One should wonder why the report stipulates early 2008 as a withdrawal date. No one, as Timothy Phelps as Newsday points out, actually believes that the Iraqi police and military will be remotely ready by then. The only feasible answer is that the date marks the beginning of the next U.S. presidential campaign. Baker and company do not want the war hanging over another election and new American presidency. Once again, American policies toward Iraq are being driven by events not on the ground but at home -- events tied in no conceivable way to the welfare and security of actual Iraqis.

Perhaps, the clearest example of the ISG's America focus is that the only realistic option that can change the dynamic of violence on the ground, immediate withdrawal of all US forces, was not included as a serious possibility. The report essentially defends the current "Iraqification" approach, and combines it with a large draw-down (although not full withdrawal) of forces over the next fifteen months. The goal is clearly to get out without it seeming like a precipitous defeat. To that end, the emphasis on diplomacy is meant to create a regional partnership that can control Iraq for the foreseeable future. None of this, however, is likely to alter the day-to-day experience of civil war and low-grade guerrilla insurgency.

Immediate American withdrawal could potentially suck the energy out of at least some of the violence. The reason often given against such a policy is that chaos would break out. But that is not why withdrawal isn't being recommended. Iraq is already experiencing one of the deadliest civil wars since World War II, with the numbers of Iraqi dead and wounded dwarfing those from Lebanon's nearly two-decade conflict (1974-1991). At present, 160,000 American troops aren't maintaining the peace, and raising the numbers in Baghdad by 20,000-30,000 over the next year won't either. Withdrawal isn't an option because the commission is again less focused on the future of Iraq and more focused on what remains of American military credibility. The only problem is that you can't help solve a problem in Iraq by thinking in terms of politics in Washington.

In the end, it took the commission nine months to tell us what we already knew and to offer advice more attuned to the interests of domestic politicians than actual Iraqis. But, then again, that's what we get for having commissions run our politics.