Making More Terrorists in Iraq

Tuesday afternoon, Bush bowed to pressure and declassified 3 pages of the 30 page National Intelligence Estimate. As repeated in newspapers everywhere, the report dated April 2006 asserts that the Iraq war has become a "cause celebre" for Islamic extremists, "breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement." It is this last claim that has been picked up by the media and emphasized by Bush's Democratic critics. In fact, despite rather desperate claims to the contrary by the Administration, it's become almost a truism -- even repeated by Musharraf in his trip to the Daily Show -- that the war in Iraq is increasing the likelihood of a terrorist attack here in the US and is strengthening Islamic extremism everywhere. Coming in the middle of an election, the clear implication is that, while "tough on terrorism" is good, Bush's particular brand of toughness is actually heightening the threat.

Yet, although it may count as common sense, for a number of reasons the oft-repeated argument that Iraq is creating new terrorists poised to attack America is neither self-evident nor good political argument. First, it once again hypes the danger posed by terrorism -- transforming what should at most be one security concern among others into the primary focus of politics. Even if Al Qaeda recruiting is up because of the war, for which scant direct evidence is provided, there is no evidence that they have increased capacity to endanger American lives and institutions. Indeed, the absence of terrorist attacks in the US over the past five years points in the opposite direction. No matter what Bush or Cheney say, civilization is not at stake. Moreover, to the extent that the war has led a few alienated Muslims to lash out at the West, it's telling that such attacks have taken place in Europe. As compared with the US, European immigrant communities -- including Muslim communities -- are far less integrated into social and political life. If anything, as some have argued, social conditions at 'home' (in the West) have more to do with the few, disorganized terrorist acts here than does the Iraq war.

But regardless of whether we're creating more terrorists or not, by viewing the success or failure of Iraq through the prism of terrorism we end up displacing what should be the central concern. The war in Iraq should be opposed because it makes a mockery of the principle of self-rule and has produced a horrendous and disruptive degree of violence. The result is a tragedy -- one sustained by the terrorism discourse and which must end whether or not a boomerang effect exists.

Al-Qaeda in Mogadishu?

The BBC reported yesterday that the interim prime minister of Somalia, Ali Mohamed Ghedi, had called for "international help against the 'al-Qaeda' and 'terrorist' expansion in the country." The event precipitating this newest cry for help from Somalia's 'transitional government' is the Union of Islamic Court's (UIC) recent entry into Kismayo, Somalia's major southern port city, once consider a possible landing point for peacekeepers. The UIC has made headlines for two reasons. First, it has done what no other political power has done since 1991: brought a degree of peace and order to southern Somalia. Second, it is Islamist, leading to fears that it might have terrorist links.

In fact, as we have written before, the evidence for the terrorist connection in Somalia is poor, to say the least. What there *is* good evidence for is that Western intervention in Somalia has done little to resolve the conflict there, and probably done a great deal to strengthen the hand of the UIC. While the transitional government has played negotiating games at endless international negotiations, the UIC has done the somewhat harder work of developing a solid , relatively cohesive political organization in Somalia - something the secular warlords were never able to do. Indeed, Indeed, as the New York Times reported recently about the UIC in Mogadishu:

"Instead of acting like the Taliban and ruthlessly imposing a harsh religious orthodoxy, as many feared, the Islamists seem to be trying to increase public support by softening their views, at least officially, delivering social services and pushing for democratic elections. Islamic leaders are operating almost in campaign mode, organizing street cleanups, visiting hospitals, overseeing a mini building boom and recruiting elderly policemen to don faded uniforms they have not worn for years and return to work."

And the UIC entered Kismayo without firing a shot. In other words, while there are no doubt those who do not support the UIC, it is clearly the most legitimate power in southern Somalia. It has become a force able to bring a degree of unity and stability to the southern territory, and certainly enjoys the widest support of any really existing political organization there.

A while back we noted that fragile third world regimes had acquired a tendency to talk up the terrorist threat at home in order to acquire various kinds of international support - usually aimed at bolstering their repressive state apparatus. Ghedi's cry for help looks like more of the same. Ghedi's 'transitional government' looks on its way to transitioning out of existence. It now controls only one town in all of Somalia - Baidoa - and it does that only precariously. Ethiopian troops have been reported crossing into Somalia, and entering Baidoa to defend Ghedi's government from the inevitable collision with the UIC. Ghedi knows his days may be numbered. He also must know that the West is unlikely to get involved in an African 'peacekeeping' venture unless there are dire stakes. It is no surprise that he has discovered 'Al-Qaeda' in Mogadishu.

A Victory for France

Everyone has seized on the fragile UN resolution as an opportunity to claim victory. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has claimed that his side achieved a “historic strategic victory” against Israel. Yet Hezbollah is in many ways in a tighter spot than before. It will be far more difficult for it to operate as independently as it had been now that 15,000 Lebanese soldiers will be paired with the same number of foreign troops. Moreover, it is equally possible that it will be at least partially blamed, at least by non-Shia elements in Lebanon, for having brought Israeli wrath down on Lebanese civilians. Indeed, if public opinion swung quickly towards Hezbollah during the initial bombing, once a cease-fire seemed possible, it was just as likely that it would turn against Hezbollah for unnecessarily prolonging a conflict. This must have been at least one reason why Nasrallah, despite defiant comments about the international community, was quick to accept the UN resolution. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government has shown itself to be helpless to defend its own country and incapable of decisive action.

Ehud Olmert, Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, also claimed this as a victory for his side, but even rhetorically his doubts were apparent. Facing internal criticism that he had not done enough, and external criticism for the disproportionate use of force and deaths of Lebanese civilians, Olmert was forced to acknowledge that the resolution leaves his government in an ambiguous spot:

"We don't plan to apologize," Olmert said. He said Israel will continue to pursue Hezbollah "everywhere and at all times. We have no intention of asking anyone's permission."

In fact, as the peace settles in, Israel will only be cast in a worse light, as the sheer scale of destruction becomes apparent, and as attention focuses on the hundreds of thousands of refugees, body counts, and reconstruction of Lebanon. No clear strategic objectives have been achieved, not even, it appears, the stated goal of disarming Hezbollah, which remains an unresolved part of the UN mission.

President Bush, too, has come out as indecisive and unable to claim the moral high ground. In fact, the White House could not even get its message straight as to whether the resolution reflected a victory for general humanitarian principles or for a particular side of the conflict. When White House Spokesman Tony Snow was “Asked who had won the conflict, Snow said, ‘diplomacy has won.’” But President Bush claims it was a victory for Israel. The confusion about the significance of the ceasefire only reflects the deeper confusion and hesitancy that beset the administration from the outset. Having spent prior diplomacy forcing Syria out of Lebanon in the name of Lebanese sovereignty, it was embarrassing for Bush to end up defending Israel’s violation of the same. In addition, Bush has burned so many bridges in the Middle East and internationally over the past five years that from the beginning he was incapable of playing anything like a mediating role. Bush’s support for Israel reflected less a decisive stance than a default position into which he fell for lack of any clearer sense of how to approach the situation. He seems to have hoped that Israel’s war might revive his own war on terror by proxy.

It is into this vacuum that France stepped. Unlike Bush, France was able to leverage its ties to Lebanon, and its relative credibility, into a broadly accepted mediating role. Not only did it take the lead on the UN diplomacy, it has also promised to contribute its own troops, which even more profoundly signals France’s effort to claim ownership of the UN resolution. This is not the first time France has taken advantage of Bush’s diplomatic weakness. The joint peace-keeping operation in Haiti in 2004 involved the unprecedented violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which basically outlines the United States’ unilateral claim to the sole right to send troops to the Western Hemisphere any South or Central American nation. The Bush administration’s acceptance of French peacekeepers in Haiti was a thinly veiled attempt by the powers to mend fences, and tacit admission of weakness by Bush. This time, France has clearly dominated the ‘cooperative effort’. While Bush cannot even decide where exactly he stands on the resolution, France continues to push for the ceasefire, and to prepare troops for the pending operations. As the BBC summarizes it, not only has France “emerged with increased influence” but it has done so without having to abandon its “its philosophical opposition to the Bush administration.”

However, if France has won a victory, it is a strange victory indeed. For France is able to claim victory because it was the party best able to appear like it had no stake in the conflict whatsoever – it was most able to don the mantle of disinterested mediator. In other words, France has been able to elevate its status by presenting itself as if it has no interest in the situation. France’s victory is, in this way, a victory for the politics of posture, which, despite all the violence and bloodshed, dominated this war, over the politics of substance. France’s victory relies on it not pursuing anything more than a burnishing of its diplomatic image. Even this victory, then, is self-limiting. Chirac can only take credit up to a point, before which it becomes transparent that he, too, is instrumentalizing the conflict for his own political gain. The more Chirac appears a specifically French statesman, the less he can appear as a neutral humanitarian diplomat. For all the violence, bloodshed, and grandstanding, no party seems to have gained much by the start or the end of this conflict.

Conflicts Without Borders

On Tuesday President Bush and Secretary Rice discussed the US-France draft ceasefire resolution. The first reporter to speak questioned Bush and Rice about the fact that neither party to the conflict has spoken out in support of the draft, and Lebanon in particular has rejected it. Rice responded by saying “obviously, the parties have views on how to stop this. Their views are not going to necessarily be consonant about how to stop it. The international community has a view.” We may all note that the international community’s “view” appears to be equated with, if not superior to, the “view” of Lebanon, the country that has been invaded.

Humanitarian advocates have long been pushing for the international community to recognize the rights and actions of subgroups or individuals within states. On this site, we have repeatedly defended a robust vision of state sovereignty and warned of the negative consequences that result from its deconstruction (more on sovereignty here).

Israel’s present attack on Lebanon is an excellent example of just such negative consequences. The military activity is everywhere described as a war between Hezbollah and Israel or an attack on Hezbollah. To Lebanese, and those who support them, these characterizations seem to represent media bias. After all, Israel’s actions have affected the entire nation; they are rightly described as attacks on Lebanon as a whole, and cannot meaningfully be understood as isolated incidents aimed at Hezbollah. But the problem is not one of deception, or partial reporting. It is representative of the current international order, in which state sovereignty has been severely eroded. In this age of anti-sovereignty it is perfectly within Israel’s province to take aim at a non-state actor if that actor is deemed dangerous, destabilizing (or best of all, a terrorist)—the rest of the country be damned. The erosion of sovereignty has in this way made it easier to act militarily, without the difficulties that would have attended state-to-state negotiations and diplomacy, or the political clarity required of declaring war.

It is not simple pro-Israeli bias or mere coincidence that has led to the almost-shocking acceptance of Israel’s bombardment of another country in the name of weakening a subgroup within that state. It is instead the logical conclusion of today’s humanitarian interventionism and the various attempts to disaggregate individuals from the states in which they reside. Within this international order, there is deemed to be no problem with one country or international force invading a sovereign nation in the name of opposing a group or movement deemed “rogue” by the international community. The only question that remains, within such a framework, is whether the action is proportionate. The result, in this case, is that Israel gets to “to settle internal Lebanese dialogue by Israeli force of arms,” just as international interventions have long worked to override domestic political dynamics for the benefit of other nations or regions. This is the single most significant reason why the principle of national sovereignty was crucial to the possibility of third world independence and self-determination, and why today it remains the case that we should, and must, defend it.

Not even the Lebanese government defends its territory on sovereign grounds today. The bizarre upshot of the humanitarian international order is that Lebanon will almost surely be required to cede control over its southern territory to some purportedly benevolent international force, further weakening efforts within Lebanon to strike a domestic agreement (English version). According to a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Michel Aoun, his party and Hezbollah have been proposing to end Lebanon’s disastrous six-decades’ old confessional system—a gift left to the country by the departing French occupiers at the end of World War II. Among their plans have been to bring an end to the allocation of political representation along sectarian lines, as well as to strengten Lebanon’s central government in preparation for its ability to truly take control of the entire country. These two proposals would take perhaps the most important steps in assuring a strong, stable, and democratic Lebanon. But now the Lebanese domestic process has been short-circuited. While various parties within Lebanon had been working toward political agreements that would benefit Lebanon, any UN resolutions will be concerned only with the interests of the US, Israel, and Europe.

By Israeli Force of Arms

Although Israel's current campaign in Lebanon has received seemingly unlimited press and pundit attention, clarifying analysis has been hard to come by. Knesset Member Azmi Bishara, provides much needed food-for-thought in an article for Al-Ahram Weekly. Bishara takes aim at everything from the Israeli leadership to the international forces that will eventually enmesh themselves in Lebanon. Most of all, he focuses attention back on what really matters: the Lebanese state and the collective will of the Lebanese people. The article is well worth a read in its entirety. Here are a few choice excerpts:

"Any comparison between Olmert's and Nasrallah's political rhetoric must conclude that the latter is the more rational. His speeches are more consistent with the facts and rely less than Olmert's on religious expressions and allusions... "

"[Israeli leaders] possess the keys to the machinery of a state, a real state, one that is secure in its identity, that has clear national security goals and channels of national mobilisation, as opposed to a long deferred project for statehood and a states [sic] built on the fragmentation of national identity..."

"Israel...has decided to settle internal Lebanese dialogue by Israeli force of arms...
Israel's aim is to change the rules of the game between Israel and Lebanon and, therefore, within Lebanon itself. This is the only point of similarity between the current campaign and the war of 1982. The major differences are that, on the negative side, international and regional circumstances favour Israel, while on the positive side the resistance, which is not Palestinian but Lebanese this time, is much stronger and better organised...Even after the Syrian withdrawal the Lebanese society has much more positive attitude towards the Lebanese resistance than it had towards the Palestinian resistance, in those days of 1982 a part of the Lebanese people fought on the side of the Israelis. The initiative now lies in the hands of the Lebanese people and the resistance. They, alone, have the ability to thwart the conspiracy..."

"The resistance isn't playing the role of victim. It didn't ask for international sympathy with the victims but for solidarity among freedom-seeking peoples. These are the rules of another game, a language that Arab regimes have forgotten, if they ever really knew it, though they owe their own existence to such a discourse..."

"[T]he charge that the resistance has courted disaster betrays the existence of an Arab camp that regards robust resistance in Lebanon and Palestine as an adventure."

Also, for a thorough explanation of Hezbollah's history, its relationship to Lebanon, and its activities leading up to the present crisis, read Lara Deeb's "Hizballah: A Primer."

Ayman Who? Take Two

Is the current 'Lebanon crisis' part of the war on terror? President Bush seems to think so, or at least, would like it to be. That's why he has essentially given Israel a green light to rampage in southern Lebanon. So too, it would appear, does Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has been desperately trying to sustain Al-Qaeda's relevance against the greater interest being paid to insurgents in Iraq, and Hamas and Hezbollah. In his recent entreaty to Muslims around the world, Zawahiri, like Bush, attempted to cast the regional conflict as a global war. He said Al-Qaeda views "all the world as a battlefield open in front of us." Bush and Zawahiri's fantasy is, to a degree, mutual. Both would like to instrumentalize a regional conflict for their own gain. Bush's scandal-ridden war on terror, and now widely unpopular Iraq adventure, has been in need of some new sources of righteous indignation, which Bush seems to be seeking in the reflected glory of Israel's attack. The actual existence and staying power of Hezbollah appears to give more substance to Bush's war on terror than the practically non-existent face off with Al-Qaeda.

Zawahiri's gambit, however, is even more desperate. In little over a month, Hezbollah and to a lesser degree Hamas, have been able to garner far more popular support amongst Arabs and Muslims than Al-Qaeda ever has. As this editorial in the Mercury News notes, over the past days:

"Al-Qaida feels upstaged...At large demonstrations in the Arab world, many people were carrying pictures of Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, celebrating him as a hero in ways that Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden never has been."

Indeed, Al-Qaeda's increasing irrelevance is reflected in Zawahiri's attempt to make his organization seem more inclusive: "religious puritanism and sectarianism were no longer topics; instead he called on ``all the weak'' to unite against ``injustice.'' Zawahiri was even forced to (rhetorically) abandon the narrow Wahhabi basis of Al-Qaeda, and to call for Sunni and Shia to join together in a holy war against the United States. These lame attempts at hoisting Al-Qaeda's wagon to the engines of more popular movements elsewhere are doomed to fail. Where Hezbollah and Hamas have made an effort to represent actual constituencies in an existing conflict, Al-Qaeda has done the opposite. And its political philosophy, such as it is, is oriented more towards spectacular media events and apocalyptic global visions, than political results and popular mobilization. Behind Al-Qaeda's once exaggerated sense of its own importance, is an awareness that the war on terror has moved on. Indeed, one interesting aspect of the war on terror itself is that today Al-Qaeda plays such an insignificant role.

Levels of Complicity

A short while back, the New York Times had a lengthy piece on the evolving role of the security forces in Iraq. Their well-known complicity in the ongoing violence makes the situation appear quite bleak. Elements from the Ministry of Defense are exposed as having actively aided the Sunni insurgency, just as Shiite death squads from the Interior Ministry have targeted the Sunni minority. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Underneath the seemingly clear sectarian division lies a vast network of competing security agencies and a “galaxy” of armed groups, each with its own loyalties. Significantly, since the various armed groups act on behalf of either political parties or factions within the government (or insurgents), there is nothing resembling unanimity among Iraq’s leaders on how to address the problem, or even how properly to identify it.

In some sense, then, it is difficult to see how this situation will be brought under control as the sectarian divisions become endemic to the way in which Iraq is governed. (In spite of the uplifting “turning-point” rhetoric of the new cabinet appointments, one doubts how significantly this will improve things in the long run.) And the situation seems to be getting worse, not better. According to the LA Times, more people died last month in Baghdad than in any other month since the invasion. The figure, just shy of 1,400, does not include soldiers nor victims of explosions, making the number all the more breathtaking for what it says about the spiraling sectarian divide and the role of the security forces. Yet, as the BBC reports, “[N]o-one believes these are the true figures from the violence in and around Baghdad as many bodies are not taken to the morgue, or are never found…”

Although the New York Times treats the American effort to build the Iraqi security forces as a failure, they regard the ensuing violence as though it were a mere byproduct of that failure. In other words, it was the half-hearted effort that helped lead Iraq to its current insecurity. But is that all there is to it? Was the effort itself essentially pure-of-heart and lacking only in the execution?

In fact, as Lenin’s Tomb points out, the history of the security build up has been anything but a well-meant but under-staffed affair. From US-sponsored assassination and kidnapping squads, to the portfolios of certain figures charged with training and leading the security forces, the weight of the violence seems not so much a byproduct, as a coordinated plan that, admittedly, has gotten beyond anyone’s control. In short, though sectarian divisions exist within Iraq, what made them decisive to the security situation was the corrosive influence that the United States had on the initial training and recruiting of the various forces. The murderous role that certain police commandos were playing, says LT, was known from the beginning. “Yet there’s no consistency to the narrative, there’s no sense of connecting these things.” There is, he says, a “perceptible prohibition” against taking the narrative beyond the causes of death or identification of the parties involved. Those ultimately responsible appear to have had no influence at all.