The Antiwar Movement: Back to Basics?

In this engaging article about the antiwar movement, Celina de Leon writes that the antiwar movement has dramatically shifted tactics. "Mass national protests didn't sway the Bush administration, so young organizers have focused on local counter-recruitment campaigns." One organizer attempts to explain the mistake the antiwar movement made: ""For a long time we've hoped that we would be able to provide training and somehow somewhere, somebody else was going to step up and organize on the local level. We have to shift our tactics. A lot has changed, and unfortunately the anti-war movement hasn't." As far as it goes, there is some sense in this argument. One major failure of the antiwar movement has been its spontaneity. In the haste to capitalize on public discontent, the protest did not sink real institutionalized roots, thereby failing really to become a 'movement'. There was little to organize around beyond low-level discontent, and the protest organizers did little to elevate this discontent into political activity shaped around clear principles.

The reported organizational change is an important sign of self-reflection and experimentation by activists. However, the shift from national to local organizing addresses only one, and not even the most serious, problem with the antiwar position. It is a tactical shift, in which the only changes in the content of the message and political ideas are linked to the exigencies of organizing at the local level. As de Leon's article reports, for the most part, the organizing message remains the same: "It's all about oil, it's all about money, it's all about power." As even the organizers recognize, this is not obviously a positive message. As the youth and counter-recruitment coordinator for the New York War Resisters League points out "I think young people often feel that there's not much they can do about it. There's not a sense of empowerment or that energy or ability to make change."

The antiwar position struggles to develop positive principles that rise above expressions of political cynicism, alienation and frustration. It tends actively to avoid developing a clear political argument, beyond a vague 'withdraw the troops' position, which accommodates everything from a liberal abdication of responsibility, to the rote left 'anti-imperialism', to pure cynicism, to a more principled defense of Iraqi sovereignty and self-determination.

The antiwar activists do so mainly for tactical reasons, believing that the point is not to interpret the situation but to make a difference. Real political action, of course, does not recognize a conflict between the activity of reflecting about principles on the one hand and engagement on the other. So while the shift in organizing tactics is indeed an interesting development in the antiwar movement, it is not obviously the most needed change. The antiwar position needs to be willing to take the step back and argue matters of principle, and make clearer what exactly it is fighting for, even at the potential cost of losing friends and allies. So long as protests are chained to positions like 'Addicted to Oil' and 'Not In Our Name', the fetters of cynicism and defeatism will remain the central constraints on the development of a genuinely oppositional political position

Book Review: Slavoj Zizek's 'Welcome to the Desert of the Real'

In a book we recently reviewed, Peter Beinart argues that the war on terror presents us with a challenge of political faith. Do we side with the fundamentalism that the terrorists represent, or do we side with the tolerance and freedom of liberal democracy? The thrust of Beinart’s argument is that those on the left who criticized the war in Iraq, and even more, who critique the war on terror, are caught in the trap of anti-Americanism and relativism – they think the evil committed by the United States is equally, perhaps more, objectionable than that committed by the terrorists. The way certain policies are carried out may be criticized, but not the overall project of defending liberal democracy from totalitarianism. This, says the iconoclastic Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, is what makes the war on terror a conservative, ideological event. Read on for our review of Zizek’s Welcome to the Desert of the Real.

France Vacillates

Even as France appeared to have 'won' the latest round of diplomatic maneuvering in the Middle East, it is having second thoughts. The BBC reports that France is reconsidering troop deployment to Lebanon. As of yet, France has not even formally committed to sending troops to enforce the resolution that France brokered. It is no surprise that, once it comes to material commitments, the diplomats prevaricate. France's main interest was in being seen to win the diplomatic tussle, not in a long-term commitment to political engagement.

It is worth considering whether or not French diplomatic concerns with Lebanon are chauvinistic at root. European governments want to preside over local peace agreements between Israel and her neighbors, not because their ideas about reconciliation are more powerful or complete, but because it gives the EU governments a gloss of rationality that they cannot earn at home. French diplomnatic chauvinism presents itself in the guise of the 'honest broker,' who, after raising a stink over its own peace plan, cannot summon the will to defend it.

A Victory for France

Everyone has seized on the fragile UN resolution as an opportunity to claim victory. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has claimed that his side achieved a “historic strategic victory” against Israel. Yet Hezbollah is in many ways in a tighter spot than before. It will be far more difficult for it to operate as independently as it had been now that 15,000 Lebanese soldiers will be paired with the same number of foreign troops. Moreover, it is equally possible that it will be at least partially blamed, at least by non-Shia elements in Lebanon, for having brought Israeli wrath down on Lebanese civilians. Indeed, if public opinion swung quickly towards Hezbollah during the initial bombing, once a cease-fire seemed possible, it was just as likely that it would turn against Hezbollah for unnecessarily prolonging a conflict. This must have been at least one reason why Nasrallah, despite defiant comments about the international community, was quick to accept the UN resolution. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government has shown itself to be helpless to defend its own country and incapable of decisive action.

Ehud Olmert, Israel’s embattled Prime Minister, also claimed this as a victory for his side, but even rhetorically his doubts were apparent. Facing internal criticism that he had not done enough, and external criticism for the disproportionate use of force and deaths of Lebanese civilians, Olmert was forced to acknowledge that the resolution leaves his government in an ambiguous spot:

"We don't plan to apologize," Olmert said. He said Israel will continue to pursue Hezbollah "everywhere and at all times. We have no intention of asking anyone's permission."

In fact, as the peace settles in, Israel will only be cast in a worse light, as the sheer scale of destruction becomes apparent, and as attention focuses on the hundreds of thousands of refugees, body counts, and reconstruction of Lebanon. No clear strategic objectives have been achieved, not even, it appears, the stated goal of disarming Hezbollah, which remains an unresolved part of the UN mission.

President Bush, too, has come out as indecisive and unable to claim the moral high ground. In fact, the White House could not even get its message straight as to whether the resolution reflected a victory for general humanitarian principles or for a particular side of the conflict. When White House Spokesman Tony Snow was “Asked who had won the conflict, Snow said, ‘diplomacy has won.’” But President Bush claims it was a victory for Israel. The confusion about the significance of the ceasefire only reflects the deeper confusion and hesitancy that beset the administration from the outset. Having spent prior diplomacy forcing Syria out of Lebanon in the name of Lebanese sovereignty, it was embarrassing for Bush to end up defending Israel’s violation of the same. In addition, Bush has burned so many bridges in the Middle East and internationally over the past five years that from the beginning he was incapable of playing anything like a mediating role. Bush’s support for Israel reflected less a decisive stance than a default position into which he fell for lack of any clearer sense of how to approach the situation. He seems to have hoped that Israel’s war might revive his own war on terror by proxy.

It is into this vacuum that France stepped. Unlike Bush, France was able to leverage its ties to Lebanon, and its relative credibility, into a broadly accepted mediating role. Not only did it take the lead on the UN diplomacy, it has also promised to contribute its own troops, which even more profoundly signals France’s effort to claim ownership of the UN resolution. This is not the first time France has taken advantage of Bush’s diplomatic weakness. The joint peace-keeping operation in Haiti in 2004 involved the unprecedented violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which basically outlines the United States’ unilateral claim to the sole right to send troops to the Western Hemisphere any South or Central American nation. The Bush administration’s acceptance of French peacekeepers in Haiti was a thinly veiled attempt by the powers to mend fences, and tacit admission of weakness by Bush. This time, France has clearly dominated the ‘cooperative effort’. While Bush cannot even decide where exactly he stands on the resolution, France continues to push for the ceasefire, and to prepare troops for the pending operations. As the BBC summarizes it, not only has France “emerged with increased influence” but it has done so without having to abandon its “its philosophical opposition to the Bush administration.”

However, if France has won a victory, it is a strange victory indeed. For France is able to claim victory because it was the party best able to appear like it had no stake in the conflict whatsoever – it was most able to don the mantle of disinterested mediator. In other words, France has been able to elevate its status by presenting itself as if it has no interest in the situation. France’s victory is, in this way, a victory for the politics of posture, which, despite all the violence and bloodshed, dominated this war, over the politics of substance. France’s victory relies on it not pursuing anything more than a burnishing of its diplomatic image. Even this victory, then, is self-limiting. Chirac can only take credit up to a point, before which it becomes transparent that he, too, is instrumentalizing the conflict for his own political gain. The more Chirac appears a specifically French statesman, the less he can appear as a neutral humanitarian diplomat. For all the violence, bloodshed, and grandstanding, no party seems to have gained much by the start or the end of this conflict.

Guest Essay: Unilateralism, Deterrence and the War in Lebanon

As part of this evening's event, we are posting short essays by each of the speakers, so that those who cannot attend can get a sense of the issues that will be discussed. Our first essay is by Guy Grossman, a Ph.D student at Columbia University in Political Science, and one of the founders of the refuser's movement in Israel. For the whole text of the essay, click here...What follows are selections from

Unilateralism, Deterrence and the War in Lebanon
by, Guy Grossman

"Recognizing its inability to militarily enforce a change in the status-quo, Israel – in what seems the most dramatic result of the latest round of violence - is turning to the international community for help in securing its northern border."

"But the fact that the war was unplanned or that it is achieving its exact opposite goals (from Israel’s stand-point), should not be interpreted as if there is no underlying “logic” to the operation’s deterioration...Instead I argue that the war was a logical outcome of the confluence of three political developments: (a) Israel’s unilateralism; (b) the strengthening of the Islamist forces in the Arab world; and (c) America’s commitments to “war on terror”."

"Unilateralism meant that Israel abandoned the (rhetorical) search for peace, which was no longer viewed as a superior strategic option. This meant that Israel was to rely more heavily on its military’s deterrent power."

"Finally, in terms of Israeli domestic politics, as this war continuous to be fought out, the government’s ultimate goal – its own survival – is also being undermined. Left with little maneuvering space, it seems that the days of Olmert’s government are numbered...Thus the war that is fought now is not about the survival of the country, but rather it is about the survival of the government. This of course is not the entire story, but I believe it goes a long way in explaining how a collective punishment expedition, which was launched with little preparation and deliberation, and which was based on distorted and arrogant evaluations and on unattainable promises, morphed into a dreadful all-out war."

Read on...

Conflicts Without Borders

On Tuesday President Bush and Secretary Rice discussed the US-France draft ceasefire resolution. The first reporter to speak questioned Bush and Rice about the fact that neither party to the conflict has spoken out in support of the draft, and Lebanon in particular has rejected it. Rice responded by saying “obviously, the parties have views on how to stop this. Their views are not going to necessarily be consonant about how to stop it. The international community has a view.” We may all note that the international community’s “view” appears to be equated with, if not superior to, the “view” of Lebanon, the country that has been invaded.

Humanitarian advocates have long been pushing for the international community to recognize the rights and actions of subgroups or individuals within states. On this site, we have repeatedly defended a robust vision of state sovereignty and warned of the negative consequences that result from its deconstruction (more on sovereignty here).

Israel’s present attack on Lebanon is an excellent example of just such negative consequences. The military activity is everywhere described as a war between Hezbollah and Israel or an attack on Hezbollah. To Lebanese, and those who support them, these characterizations seem to represent media bias. After all, Israel’s actions have affected the entire nation; they are rightly described as attacks on Lebanon as a whole, and cannot meaningfully be understood as isolated incidents aimed at Hezbollah. But the problem is not one of deception, or partial reporting. It is representative of the current international order, in which state sovereignty has been severely eroded. In this age of anti-sovereignty it is perfectly within Israel’s province to take aim at a non-state actor if that actor is deemed dangerous, destabilizing (or best of all, a terrorist)—the rest of the country be damned. The erosion of sovereignty has in this way made it easier to act militarily, without the difficulties that would have attended state-to-state negotiations and diplomacy, or the political clarity required of declaring war.

It is not simple pro-Israeli bias or mere coincidence that has led to the almost-shocking acceptance of Israel’s bombardment of another country in the name of weakening a subgroup within that state. It is instead the logical conclusion of today’s humanitarian interventionism and the various attempts to disaggregate individuals from the states in which they reside. Within this international order, there is deemed to be no problem with one country or international force invading a sovereign nation in the name of opposing a group or movement deemed “rogue” by the international community. The only question that remains, within such a framework, is whether the action is proportionate. The result, in this case, is that Israel gets to “to settle internal Lebanese dialogue by Israeli force of arms,” just as international interventions have long worked to override domestic political dynamics for the benefit of other nations or regions. This is the single most significant reason why the principle of national sovereignty was crucial to the possibility of third world independence and self-determination, and why today it remains the case that we should, and must, defend it.

Not even the Lebanese government defends its territory on sovereign grounds today. The bizarre upshot of the humanitarian international order is that Lebanon will almost surely be required to cede control over its southern territory to some purportedly benevolent international force, further weakening efforts within Lebanon to strike a domestic agreement (English version). According to a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Michel Aoun, his party and Hezbollah have been proposing to end Lebanon’s disastrous six-decades’ old confessional system—a gift left to the country by the departing French occupiers at the end of World War II. Among their plans have been to bring an end to the allocation of political representation along sectarian lines, as well as to strengten Lebanon’s central government in preparation for its ability to truly take control of the entire country. These two proposals would take perhaps the most important steps in assuring a strong, stable, and democratic Lebanon. But now the Lebanese domestic process has been short-circuited. While various parties within Lebanon had been working toward political agreements that would benefit Lebanon, any UN resolutions will be concerned only with the interests of the US, Israel, and Europe.

BEYOND HUMANITARIAN OUTRAGE

The Israel-Lebanon conflict continues to dominate headlines and stir public debate, yet for all the volume of commentary there is very little depth. Coverage and criticism has emphasized humanitarian arguments about tactics over political arguments about power and responsibility. Defenders of Israel’s incursion of Lebanon have focused on Hezbollah’s indiscriminate targeting of Israeli civilians, and have argued that Hezbollah endangers Lebanon’s own civilians by intermingling with the non-combatant population. They have also argued that Israel does not intentionally target civilians, whereas Hezbollah does. Critics of Israel have pointed to the fact that Israel has killed far more civilians than Hezbollah, has used disproportionate force, and has reduced whole neighborhoods to rubble. On both sides of the argument, the critique tends to revolve around who is creating the most victims, or who most profoundly violates broad humanitarian impulses. Many argue that both sides are creating victims, and that the international community is needed to bring peace. But is this right? Are humanitarian debates about tactics really a way of developing a critical position on this conflict? Is the international community the solution? This Friday, Against the War on Terror will be holding following event to address these pressing questions:

BEYOND HUMANITARIAN OUTRAGE: ASSESSING THE ISRAEL-LEBANON CONFLICT

Beyond platitudes about victims on both sides, are there more substantial issues raised by Israel's incursion into Lebanon?
Why is the debate dominated by arguments about whose tactics are worse?
Is 'who started it?' an analytical dead-end?
Is a third-party really required to bring peace? Does America have all the answers?
Can we discuss the 'ends' rather than the 'means' of this war?

Come for an informal discussion about these questions. Introductory remarks will be given by
- Nicholas Frayn, of Against the War on Terror www.againstwot.com
- Guy Grossman, Ph.D student in political science at Columbia University and a founder of the Israeli refuser's movement
- Ramzi Kassem, who was born in Beirut, and is now a practicing lawyer in New York City, focusing on civil rights litigation relating to wrongful conviction cases and an adjunct professor at Fordham Law School.

Opening remarks will be short, and there will be plenty of time for open discussion.

The event will take place at 6:30pm., Friday, August 11, in the Lindsay Rogers Room, 7th floor of Columbia University's International Affairs Building (corner of Amsterdam and 118 th St.). FREE PIZZA will be available.

Is the Antiwar Movement Back?

In this puff piece on the protests over Israel's incursion into Lebanon, the author claims that recent events have reignited the antiwar movement. According to the article,

"[i]n the past three weeks alone, 3,000 new people have registered on ANSWER's website, and the group has helped plan a five-city protest against Israeli aggression that will occur on August 12."

The article also notes that groups that have generally stayed home, like Lebanese-Americans, are coming out, and that there is greater cooperation between Muslim and Arab organizations on the one hand, and umbrella organizations like ANSWER on the other.

Lost amidst the bubbly excitement of the piece, however, is any reflection over why the antiwar movement should need reinvigoration. Unlike Vietnam, where protest was nonexistent to start and then mounted to widespread, sustained, and intense displays by the late 1960s, here it has been nearly the opposite. The largest protests occured mainly before the war began, protest has been sporadic, and it has not improved in its organization.

The article ends where it should have begun - not with heady excitement that another outrage has provoked a momentary response, but with reflection about how to sustain political interest and expand political perspectives. The move from reaction to action is what the antiwar movement has failed to achieve. It seems, instead, to prefer to move from crisis to crisis.

By Israeli Force of Arms

Although Israel's current campaign in Lebanon has received seemingly unlimited press and pundit attention, clarifying analysis has been hard to come by. Knesset Member Azmi Bishara, provides much needed food-for-thought in an article for Al-Ahram Weekly. Bishara takes aim at everything from the Israeli leadership to the international forces that will eventually enmesh themselves in Lebanon. Most of all, he focuses attention back on what really matters: the Lebanese state and the collective will of the Lebanese people. The article is well worth a read in its entirety. Here are a few choice excerpts:

"Any comparison between Olmert's and Nasrallah's political rhetoric must conclude that the latter is the more rational. His speeches are more consistent with the facts and rely less than Olmert's on religious expressions and allusions... "

"[Israeli leaders] possess the keys to the machinery of a state, a real state, one that is secure in its identity, that has clear national security goals and channels of national mobilisation, as opposed to a long deferred project for statehood and a states [sic] built on the fragmentation of national identity..."

"Israel...has decided to settle internal Lebanese dialogue by Israeli force of arms...Israel's aim is to change the rules of the game between Israel and Lebanon and, therefore, within Lebanon itself. This is the only point of similarity between the current campaign and the war of 1982. The major differences are that, on the negative side, international and regional circumstances favour Israel, while on the positive side the resistance, which is not Palestinian but Lebanese this time, is much stronger and better organised...Even after the Syrian withdrawal the Lebanese society has much more positive attitude towards the Lebanese resistance than it had towards the Palestinian resistance, in those days of 1982 a part of the Lebanese people fought on the side of the Israelis. The initiative now lies in the hands of the Lebanese people and the resistance. They, alone, have the ability to thwart the conspiracy..."

"The resistance isn't playing the role of victim. It didn't ask for international sympathy with the victims but for solidarity among freedom-seeking peoples. These are the rules of another game, a language that Arab regimes have forgotten, if they ever really knew it, though they owe their own existence to such a discourse..."

"[T]he charge that the resistance has courted disaster betrays the existence of an Arab camp that regards robust resistance in Lebanon and Palestine as an adventure."

Also, for a thorough explanation of Hezbollah's history, its relationship to Lebanon, and its activities leading up to the present crisis, read Lara Deeb's "Hizballah: A Primer."